The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1003 environmental law. First, under the intellectual leadership of Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court elaborated constitutional doctrines of standing that curtail environmentalists' access to the federal courts. Second, in the underappreciated case of ASARCO v. Kadish, 2 the Supreme Court decisively affirmed the right of state courts to adjudicate federal claims that do not present federally justiciable " cases or controversies." New doctrinal architecture unveiled in ASARCO reverses the longstanding principle that state court decisions on claims brought by non-Article III plaintiffs lack collateral effect in federal courts. Third, the Court continued to strengthen the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. One can argue reasonably that seven of the nine major environmental statutes now accommodate state court jurisdiction, notwithstanding several lower court decisions to the contrary.
It is no accident that the milestone cases in the modern development of Article III standing pertain to environmental matters. 3 Laws usually aim to improve the condition of a class of people. To violate the law is to hurt a member of this class, creating the central predicate of Article III standing: " injury in fact."
4 Most environmental laws aim to improve the condition of the natural world. Sometimes conditions in the natural world bear on the well-being of people, and harms to the environment translate into injuries in fact to human beings. Yet, immediate connections between environmental damage and human welfare are not inevitable. Within the ambit of environmental law are remote and rarely visited lands; 5 uncommon and inconspicuous species; 6 and the depths of the seas. 7 Even when concern for human health or welfare motivates a statute, and environmental protection is only penultimate, the connection between regulated activities and human well-being can be roundabout or probabilistic. A doctrine of standing bottomed on causation and redressability could impede citizen-suit enforcement, much as the complexities of proving causation ensnarl common-law environmental claims.
8 All " ideological" plaintiffs would benefit from liberal state court standing to enforce federal law, but environmentalists have the most to gain.
The argument of this Note unfolds in four segments. In Part II, I provide a brief overview of the law of standing in state courts. My goal in
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Part II is simply to convey a sense of the various ways in which state standing law advantages public-interest plaintiffs. An in-depth, state-bystate examination of standing doctrine would be far beyond the scope of this Note. Part III lays out recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence and shows how they presage the growth of federal environmental claims in state courts. This Part discusses constitutional standing, ASARCO and its antecedents, and the important concurrent jurisdiction decisions. I evaluate concurrent jurisdiction under the major environmental statutes, and argue that all but the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 9 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 10 should be read to authorize state court jurisdiction. Finally, Part III asks whether the Supreme Court's nondiscrimination doctrine affirmatively requires state courts to apply their own, more liberal rules of justiciability to federal claims. I conclude that it does not. In Part IV, the tenor of the Note changes. Moving from the positive to the normative, I defend ASARCO and the logic of lenient state court standing for federal claims. In so doing, I rebut academic attacks issued a generation apart by Professor Freund and Judge Fletcher, respectively, who propose that state courts hearing federal claims be required to treat Article III standing as a federal question. One cannot defend ASARCO without an interpretive theory of the Supremacy Clause, one of the structural keystones of the Constitution. I use the Supreme Court's recent federalism and separation-of-powers decisions to frame my account of the Supremacy Clause. My jurisprudential argument runs as follows: When interpreting a structural provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should begin with an inquiry into dangers. If the provision guards against " tyranny" or other remote but horrific eventualities, the Court should interpret it with formal rules that keep one branch from assuming control over the settled practices of another. Otherwise, the Court should build doctrine-rules, where feasible-from the fairest reading of the text the Court can muster.
Working within this framework, I consider and rebut the thesis that state court adjudication of federal claims brought by non-Article III plaintiffs transgresses the separation of powers and, as such, should be warded off prophylactically. This question settled, I evaluate the ASARCO rule in terms of the twin meanings of supremacy: power and quality. ASARCO's framework for state court adjudication of non-Article III plaintiffs' federal claims does more for the power and quality of federal law than would the Freund-Fletcher alternative. The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1003 In Part V, the Note assesses consequences. I use the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 11 whose citizen-suit provision was gutted by the Supreme Court's standing decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 12 to illustrate the practical implications of liberal state court standing. 13 
II. PRELUDE: STANDING IN STATE COURTS
State courts do not run " public interest" and other ideological plaintiffs through the obstacle course erected by the U.S. Supreme Court under the guise of Article III. Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, unfettered by constitutional provisions analogous to Article III. True, out of respect for the legislature, or out of a sense of their own limitations, these courts customarily decline to rule on questions of law absent something like a case or controversy.
14 But state courts need not follow the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this regard, and, in practice, their default rules of justiciability tend to be more liberal. REV. 977 (1997) . My contribution differs from Grantham's in three respects. First, I show that many states already apply liberal standing to environmental claims; Congress need not pressure these states to relax their laws of standing. Second, I analyze concurrent jurisdiction under the present constellation of federal environmental laws and show that state courts can enforce most of them. When juxtaposed against the recent concurrent jurisdiction decisions, ASARCO has immediate implications for the enforcement of federal environmental law. Public-interest litigators do not need Congress to enact the implausible affront to norms of federalism that Grantham proposes. Third, I make a foray into constitutional theory and develop a new rationale for the ASARCO holding. Incidentally, my jurisprudential analysis of the structural provisions of the Constitution indicates that Grantham's proposal might run afoul of separation-of-powers principles. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
14. 1051 , 1054 (1st Cir. 1989 ) (acknowledging that Maine's law of standing is more liberal than its federal counterpart); Langford v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 822, 833 n.6 (Cal. 1987 ) (" California's [standing] requirements are less stringent than those imposed by federal law." ); Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247 , 1257 (Haw. 1992 ( showing that Hawaii has adopted a broader view than the federal courts have of what constitutes a personal stake in cases involving public rights); State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311 Alston, 440 A.2d , 1314 Alston, 440 A.2d -18 (N.J. 1981 ) (granting vehicle passengers standing to challenge a search and seizure, despite contrary holdings from the U.S. Supreme Court); Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 308-11 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (contrasting trends in New York and Article III standing law as regards challenges to exclusionary zoning).
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Taxpayer standing empowers citizens, in their capacity as taxpayers, to counter the illegal expenditure of tax revenues and other threats to the public fisc.
18 Taxpayer Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978); Blaikie v. Lindsay, 321 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 529 P.2d 438 (Wash. 1974); and Milwaukee Professional Firefighters, Local 215 v. City of Milwaukee, 253 N.W.2d 481 (Wis. 1977) .
18. Susan L. Parsons, Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: Standing Barriers and Pecuniary Restraints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 967-68 (1986) Sense and "Dual Federalism" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 858-71 (1998 26 I do not mean to deny state-to-state variation in standing law. But when considered together, the generous background principles of state court standing, the great-public-import exceptions, the taxpayer standing doctrines, and the environmental rights acts define a climate of state court openness toward public-interest litigants.
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE I now turn to developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that should motivate environmental advocates to pause before rushing off to the federal courthouse. I begin with the recent and familiar history of Article III standing. Then I recount the Court's affirmation of the right of state courts to hear federal claims absent a federally justiciable case or controversy, and explain how, in ASARCO, state court judgments in favor of non-Article III plaintiffs garnered collateral effect in federal court. Third, I review the Court's increasingly emphatic defense of the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, and tease out the implications for state court enforcement of the federal environmental statutes.
A. Article III Standing
My purpose in this Section is not to evaluate the coherence or desirability of the Court's standing decisions; rather, I want to convey in broad strokes the evolution of doctrine as seen through the lens of the 29 reworked the conceptualization of " injury in fact." The National Wildlife Federation had challenged the Department of Interior's reclassification of some 1250 tracts of federal land, opening these properties to mining. Wildlife Federation affiants stated that they used lands " in the vicinity" of areas affected by two of the 1250 reclassifications.
30 But the Supreme Court denied standing, on the grounds that the affiants did not utilize the particular portion of the tract of land (some 4500 acres out of two million) newly opened to mining.
31
On the heels of Lujan I came Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 32 in which the high court specified that an " injury in fact" must be " actual or imminent," not " conjectural or hypothetical." 33 Defenders of Wildlife had challenged the failure of the U.S. Agency for International Development to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, prior to funding projects alleged to threaten the Nile crocodile and the Asian elephant and leopard. To secure standing, Defenders produced affidavits from two members who had visited the habitat of these animals in the past, and planned to do so again. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that such " 'some day' intentions [to return]" flunk the test of imminence.
34 Drawing upon nonenvironmental cases from the 1970s and 1980s, the Court went on to explain that Article III standing also requires a showing of causation and redressability as complements to injury in fact. 35 55. See, e.g., Langford v. Gates, 610 F. Supp. 120 (C.D. Cal. 1985) . 56. This follows from the mandatory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (" If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." (emphasis added)). See Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U. S. 72, 87-89 (1991) (deeming the district court's invocation of a " futility exception" to justify dismissal rather than remand to contravene the plain language of § 1447(c)); cf. Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134 , 1142 (7th Cir. 1994 Co., 22 F.3d 534 (3d Cir. 1994); Bradgate Associates, Inc. v. Fellows, Read & Associates, Inc, 999 F.2d 745 (3d. Cir. 1993); Boyle v. MTV Networks, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Cal. 1991); and Martin v. General Motors, 753 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Mich. 1991) . But see Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that a district court may evaluate preemption before standing, and dismiss rather than remand state-law claims found to be preempted). The Cromwell concurrence and the dissent both reject this dubious proposition. Id. at 1279 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring); id. (Jones, J., dissenting). If it is defensible at all (and I think it is not), Cromwell would turn on a distinction between constitutional Article III standing and statutory standing (which may be more restrictive). The Cromwell court evaluated standing on statutory grounds (ERISA) more restrictive than Article III, so perhaps the court did not reach beyond its constitutional powers in evaluating preemption before standing. Still, the ultimate decision to dismiss rather than remand the plaintiffs' claims violates the plain language of § 1447(c).
57. Yellow Freight acknowledges compelling evidence of a congressional " expectation" of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the law at issue, Title VII, 60 but holds that such an expectation, " even if universally shared, is not an adequate substitute for a legislative decision to overcome the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." 61 The omission of " language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction . . . is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent."
62 Showing the weight of these words, the Court refused to infer a dispositive congressional intent for exclusive federal jurisdiction from statutory references to federal court procedures.
63
Yellow Freight never mentions the three-part test for rebutting concurrent jurisdiction, and while the decision includes a perfunctory incompatibility analysis, it does not describe incompatibility as sufficient to deprive state courts of jurisdiction.
64 Indeed, Yellow Freight largely follows Justice Scalia's concurrence in Tafflin v. Levitt, 65 decided only months earlier. Tafflin , Justice Scalia wrote that legislative history never suffices to break the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 66 He further proposed that " clear incompatibility" may not be adequate either, observing that the cases usually cited to illustrate clear-incompatibility analysis were decided on other grounds. 
Concurring in

Concurrent Jurisdiction in the Major Environmental Statutes
Yellow Freight would be immaterial for environmental plaintiffs if federal environmental laws addressed state court jurisdiction expressly, but it turns out that most of these statutes are mum on concurrent jurisdiction. Generally they convey an impression of exclusive federal jurisdiction, however, which has led to a number of faulty jurisdictional rulings in the lower courts. In the pages that follow I show that a close reading of these 59. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478 (citing cases dating back to 1876). Defining the federal interest in exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of the third prong (incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests), the Gulf Offshore Court points to " the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to federal claims." Id. at 483-84. 60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 § § 1201-1328 (1994) . 80. The Appendix tabulates these cases. My census may be slightly underinclusive. For the more commonly cited statutes (e.g., the CAA and the CWA), I ran Westlaw searches for state court citations to the federal statute's citizen-suit provisions and for the term " citizen suit" in conjunction with the name of the federal statute, rather than reviewing all of the many hundred state court decisions that simply mention the federal statute by name. To confirm the validity of this screen, I reviewed approximately 100 opinions from the more encompassing search (citation to the statute by name), which confirmed that virtually all such cases do not involve citizen suits concurrent jurisdiction. In most of the state cases, the judge accepted jurisdiction without discussion, or rejected jurisdiction on perfunctory grounds. The painstaking doctrinal analysis offered here will, I hope, help state judges better to understand their jurisdiction over federal environmental claims.
a. Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA), and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
Under the caption " In general" at the head of its citizen-suit clause, RCRA specifies that suits " shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." 81 A sentence later the statute explains that " [t]he district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties" to enforce the dictates of the law and to assess civil penalties. 82 The venue proposition suggests that Congress expects all RCRA claims to be brought in a single system of trial courts, and the sentence that follows intimates that that single system is the federal system.
Had Congress intended otherwise, it could have written that claims under RCRA " shall be brought in the district [or trial] court of a district in which the alleged violation occurred," or " may be brought in the district court of the district in which the alleged violation occurred." Yet Congress is not reliably precise in its use of the articles " the" and " a." Consider, for instance, these paragraphs from the citizen-suit provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the statute at issue in another concurrent jurisdiction case, Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.: 83 (1) [T] The second paragraph is not semantically correct-Congress mistakenly used the definite article " the" where it meant " a" -for it follows from the first paragraph that multiple federal district courts can have jurisdiction.
Judges should be wary of inferring substance from stray articles, especially when the inference would contravene a legal norm (here, concurrent jurisdiction) protected by clear-statement rules. In the aftermath of Yellow Freight, inferences about congressional expectations do not suffice to divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, even if those inferences follow from the language of the statute itself. 85 RCRA's phrase, " the district court for the judicial district in which the violation occurred," and the ensuing allusion to jurisdiction " without regard to the amount in controversy," arguably show that Congress had the federal courts in mind, but so do the prescriptions for federal appellate jurisdiction and the references to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Title VII and RICO, which Yellow Freight and Tafflin respectively deem insufficient for exclusive federal jurisdiction.
86
A quick glance at Title VII shows how far the Supreme Court will bend plain meanings in the interest of concurrent jurisdiction. The statute declares that " [a]ny temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 87 It makes no sense for Congress to use the imperative " shall" unless Congress thinks that Title VII creates exclusive federal jurisdiction. With regard to appellate jurisdiction, § 2000e-5(j) of Title VII specifies, " Any civil action brought under this section . . . shall be subject to appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, Title 28."
88 Sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 establish the jurisdiction of the federal circuit courts. If Title VII were read to reserve exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, then § 2000e-5(j) would be a correct statement. But if Title VII is read to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts-the Supreme Court's position in Yellow Freight-then the word " shall" must be read as " may," or the words " in federal court" must be inserted after " brought," for § 2000e-5(j) to be logically correct. The Yellow Freight Court concluded that § 2000e-5(j) and § 2000e-5(f)(2) come into play subsequent to a claim being brought in federal court. 89 In effect, then, the Court did read " brought" to mean " brought in federal court." This seems a bigger interpretive leap than simply reading the " the" whereas the RCRA citizen-suit provision, if read literally, affirmatively requires citizens to bring their claim in one particular and presumably federal court (the district court for the judicial district in which the alleged violation occurred). Sun Oil fails to canvass any of the rationales for concurrent jurisdiction under RCRA set forth in this Note.
Davis v. Sun Oil represents a minority viewpoint among judicial opinions that consider state court jurisdiction under RCRA. In Middlesex 90. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). 91. One can imagine a contrary though ultimately unconvincing view. The contrarian's argument runs thus: The references to federal procedure and federal appellate jurisdiction in Title VII, and that statute's jurisdictional provisions, are found in different clauses. By contrast, RCRA wraps venue and jurisdiction into the same paragraph, and both the venue and the jurisdiction statements use " district court" to refer to the same, particular entity (which, by the jurisdiction statement, seems to be a federal court). This position is not nonsense, but when there exist two plausible statutory interpretations, one admitting and the other denying state court jurisdiction, the norms of Yellow Freight militate in favor of the one compatible with concurrent jurisdiction.
92 Props. v. Phillips, No. CV 940364608, 1996 WL 151229 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996 ; Andrews v. Caron Bros., No. 45136, 1992 WL 67396 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992 .
99. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1) (1994) (" Any action . . . against an owner or operator of a facility shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." (emphasis added)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1994) (stating that citizen suits " shall be brought in the United States district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." (emphasis added)).
101. Both statutes specify that citizen suits against private violators " shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a); EPCRA, id. § 11046(b)(1) (1994) .
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction, and thus does not intimate that " district court" as used in the venue/jurisdiction section means U.S. district court.
103
TSCA, by contrast, expressly attaches the modifier " United States" to " district court." 104 In stating that citizen suits " shall be brought in the United States district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred,"
105 TSCA resolves the ambiguity in RCRA and comes as close as a statute can to reserving jurisdiction expressly to the federal courts without use of the phrase " exclusive jurisdiction." To find that TSCA confers state court jurisdiction, one would have to abandon plain meanings altogether, massaging the word " shall" until it acquires the shape of " may."
No court has addressed the question of concurrent jurisdiction under EPCRA; only once has the issue come up under TSCA. 106 As one would expect, that court endorsed exclusive federal jurisdiction. But the ruling is precedentially inconsequential, for the question of concurrent jurisdiction was not argued before the court, and the decision is justified with only a passing reference to the statute.
b. Endangered Species Act (ESA), Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
No defensible reading of these statutes could strip the state courts of concurrent jurisdiction. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA indicates that " [d] istrict courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties."
107 The statute also specifies that " any suit under this subsection may be brought in the judicial district in which the violation occurs."
108 It follows from Congress's use of the permissive " may," rather than the mandatory " shall," that the ESA venue clause does not dislodge state court jurisdiction. This reasoning won the Supreme Court's approval in Tafflin v. Levitt. Thus the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA seem to recapitulate the puzzle seen earlier in the citizen-suit provisions of RCRA and EPCRA. And the reasons for finding concurrent jurisdiction under those statutes apply equally to the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA. Here, though, the case for concurrent jurisdiction is stronger yet. These statutes provide for jurisdiction and venue in separate clauses, with venue coming later in the statutory scheme, much as RICO and Title VII provide separately for jurisdiction and federal court procedures. 118 The Supreme Court treated the RICO and Title VII provisions as operating subsequent to the decision to bring a claim in federal court; similarly, judges should read the venue provisions of the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA as operating subsequent to the choice between state and federal judiciaries. This analogy was plausible enough in the context of RCRA and EPCRA; it is even better here, where the " layout" of the jurisdiction and venue clauses precisely mirrors the layout of the jurisdiction and federal court procedure clauses in Title VII.
Furthermore, the venue clauses of the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA specify that actions be brought only in " the judicial district" in which the alleged violation occurred, whereas the venue language of RCRA and EPCRA requires that actions be brought in " the district court for the judicial district" in which the alleged violation took place. This is but a hair-splitting distinction; still, one might think the reference to " district court" in RCRA and EPCRA means " federal district court," whereas the use of " judicial districts" in the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA reflects only the typical venue concern of making the place of trial convenient to the defendant.
119
No court has applied the Supreme Court's concurrent-jurisdiction jurisprudence to citizen suits brought under the CAA, the CWA, or SMCRA, though state courts have thrice confronted claims under the CWA and once considered a SMCRA petition. 122 It is not true, however, that cooperative federalism renders concurrent jurisdiction irrelevant, or that cooperative federalism seems a likely explanation for the paucity of federal-law citizen suits litigated in state courts by environmentalists.
As to the first matter-irrelevance-the degree to which states have assumed responsibility for implementing federal environmental law varies from state to state and from federal statute to federal statute. Direct enforcement of federal law is needed to fill the gaps. One important gap may be claims against private parties-my search for recent citizen suits pursuant to state laws that incorporate federal requirements turned up no such claims. 123 As to the second issue, few state court claims have been brought under any of the federal environmental statutes; there is no discernable concentration of federal-law/state-court claims under those 121. 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994) (authorizing the transfer of management responsibilities to the states under the MMPA); id. § 1535 (authorizing cooperative agreements under the ESA); 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (authorizing state implementation under SMCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (authorizing state implementation of National Point Source Discharge Elimination System permits under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (allocating primary enforcement responsibility to the state regarding public water systems during any period for which the EPA administrator determines that the state has adopted and is implementing regulations no less strict than those in the SDWA); id. § 6926 (authorizing state implementation of hazardous waste management under RCRA); id. § 7410 (authorizing " state implementation plans" to enforce national air-quality standards under the CAA).
122 123. This was only a superficial search, encompassing only air-and water-quality cases decided in the last eighteen months. I have not undertaken the mind-numbing task of sifting through the universe of environmental claims under state law to ascertain fully the " indirect" reach of federal environmental law. For claims against state defendants, see supra note 122.
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IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS: DEFENDING THE STATUS QUO
This Part defends the Supreme Court's current practice of allowing state courts to hear federal claims from non-Article III plaintiffs. Defending the status quo might seem an uninteresting project. It becomes intriguing, however, when one realizes that the sparse legal scholarship on state court standing for federal law claimants almost universally supports the contrary position. 125 The level of interest grows further when one ventures, as I do in this Note, into the underexplored terrain that connects the separation-ofpowers interpretation of standing to ASARCO and its antecedents.
Moreover, the doctrinal status quo may come under pressure if the practice of environmental lawyering changes in line with the predictions of this Note. It is no secret that a wing of the Rehnquist Court disdains the " public interest" bar. ASARCO is a short, conclusory decision, which exists in tension with some of its antecedents.
126 Its durability may depend on a rationale more compelling than the one furnished by the Court.
127
This Part divides the case for imposing Article III on state courts (when they hear federal claims) into three kinds of arguments: a prophylactic defense of the separation of powers; a policy argument; and an argument for improved consistency across " the legal landscape." I proceed to show that separation-of-powers concerns do not undercut ASARCO; that policy arguments grounded in the constitutional text favor the ASARCO rule; and that ASARCO comports nicely with the contemporary legal landscape. Critiques of ASARCO operate on three levels. There is an argument for institutional formalism, an argument about policy, and an argument from the legal landscape. By " institutional formalism," I mean the view of some commentators and jurists that the Constitution should be read to protect absolutely a core domain for each instrumentality of governance. Institutional formalism is a trump card. If the Supremacy Clause means that the Supreme Court must have appellate jurisdiction over every federal question decided in state court, or, equivalently, that in no circumstance may a non-Article III plaintiff raise a federal question, then our inquiry is over, and ASARCO was wrongly decided.
A. Introduction: Answering ASARCO's Critics
The pages to come describe sympathetically the case for institutional formalism in constitutional law. I contend, however, that state court adjudication of non-Article III plaintiffs' federal claims does not generate the kind of ailment appropriately remedied with institutional formalism. This question resolved, I examine the policy considerations that undergird the Supremacy Clause, and then survey the legal landscape. Both exercises reinforce the ASARCO rule.
B. Formalism in Structural Constitutional Law
Out of the receding floodwaters of the New Deal and Second Reconstruction, the Rehnquist Court has dredged up and re-enlivened a structural Constitution. Theirs is a Constitution that separates powers among the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the federal courts; that reserves certain rights and privileges to the several states; and that withholds from Congress the general police power. Commentators divide the Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence into formal and functional strands, a taxonomy that well serves the aims of this Note. Formalists would separate the branches of government with sharp, role-distinguishing 128. SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 35 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1955) 132 Formalist separation-of-powers jurisprudence is " formal" in two senses. First, it is institutionally formal, favoring a kind of role-specific rigidity in the functions of each branch of government. Second, it imposes these distinctions with rule-based doctrines (" doctrinal formalism" ) that admit of very little judicial discretion.
133
Functionalists decry separation-of-powers formalism as a gawky hindrance to experimenting with new models of democratic governance, in line with emerging pressures and sentiments.
134 " Pragmatic" formalists demur, then lay claim to the lesser of evils.
135 Theirs is foremost a prudential thesis: that the threat to governmental efficiency and innovation posed by formalism pales in comparison to the risk that jurists applying the ad hoc balancing tests of functionalism would fail to block the incremental but (eventually) tyrannical accumulation of power in one branch.
136 Policing the arrogation of power to one branch at the expense of another is at once too indefinite and too politically charged a task for judges to execute using anything but bright-line rules-rules that corral judicial discretion, rules to which judges, public officials, and citizens alike become so inured that their use in a time of crisis would be second-nature.
Formalist and functionalist thinking also figure into the federalism debates, but with an altogether different cast. Self-professed formalists like Justice Scalia carry the standard for the states'-rights movement, yet the formalism of their new doctrines is extraordinarily confined. Only where federalism implicates the separation of powers has the Supreme Court issued an arguably formalist ruling that Congress cannot circumambulate. 137 140 Congress can get around them by using the spending power or the threat of preemption to induce the states to submit to its will.
Standards also take precedence over rules as the Court fiddles with limits to congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Twice in the last five years has the Court struck down laws enacted (nominally) pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 141 closing a sixty-year run of unequivocal, " rational basis" deference to Commerce Clause legislation.
142 But these cases do not resuscitate the troubled, pre-New Deal categorical distinctions between proper and improper objects of legislation under the Commerce Clause. Rather, they turn on the vaguest of standards: whether the target of the law at issue " substantially affects" interstate commerce. That political considerations figured into these rulings is obvious. Both decisions struck down recently enacted legislation, long before the laws could become ingrained in American life. Open-ended standards enable and call forth politically sensitized decisions.
The federalism cases reinforce Redish and Cisar's belief that the Court's power to backtrack is very constrained once the Court has allowed a structural change in American governance. The Court is not powerless, but its power is largely one of signaling or reinforcing ideas, and tracking political movements, rather than braking runaway trains. Fixing the status quo in place with institutional formalism may be within the judicial competence; unilaterally undoing the status quo is not.
C. The Supremacy Clause and the Separation of Powers
Back to the Supremacy Clause. The task at hand is to decide whether this Clause should be read to permit state court adjudication of federal claims brought by non-Article III plaintiffs. The leading choices are both doctrinally formal; they assume the guise of clear-cut rules. ASARCO always permits state courts to apply their lenient, home-grown rules of justiciability to federal claims. The Freund-Fletcher alternative would never permit deviations from Article III for federal questions. Neither approach will yield maybe-yes/maybe-no cases that require discernment and balancing. This is appropriate. There are no common practices of governance to be unsettled, as in the federalism setting, nor are there sensitive, individualized questions of justice that evoke equitable sensibilities. Simple rules will serve just fine.
Though ASARCO and the Freund-Fletcher alternative are both doctrinally formal, only the latter is institutionally formal, in the sense that it protects without qualification the Supreme Court's ability to review all lower court decisions on federal questions. This sharp demarcation of the role of the Court echoes the thinking of separation-of-powers formalists. ASARCO, by contrast, makes a minor intrusion on the Supreme Court's customary domain. But is there a looming threat that must be warded off with the Freund-Fletcher prophylaxis? To pose the question seems almost laughable.
ASARCO does not position state courts to usurp federal law. It traverses no slippery slope bereft of doctrinal toeholds. The " threat" to federal law, if that is the term for it, is that state courts will interpret federal law too narrowly.
143 Improperly broad interpretations would only arise in the setting of a plaintiff victory, which by ASARCO amounts to an injury in fact to the defendant, allowing the Supreme Court to hear the case on appeal. Publicinterest groups would surely answer unduly narrow interpretations by soliciting Article III plaintiffs to challenge the same law in federal court, giving the federal judiciary a chance to correct the state court's mistake.
144
In exceptional cases, no Article III plaintiffs may exist. Here, though, a U.S. Attorney presumably could step in with a federal court enforcement action.
145 Congress could respond, too, by stripping the state courts of jurisdiction over federal claims, 146 or by amending citizen-suit provisions to require Article III standing. All three branches of the federal government 143. Improperly broad interpretations would only arise in the setting of a plaintiff victory, which by ASARCO amounts to an injury in fact to the defendant, so the Supreme Court could hear the case on appeal.
144. As a matter of comity, state courts then would defer to the federal interpretation, just as federal courts defer to state court interpretations of state law in diversity cases.
145. But this raises an interesting question: Would the federal courts be overstepping their Article III bounds by hearing a case, brought by a U.S. Attorney, in which no private citizen has suffered an injury in fact? I think the answer is context-specific. Certainly the public attorney may no more seek an advisory opinion than her private counterpart. But in most environmental enforcement actions the government has a tangible interest-civil penalties owed to the Treasury-that private parties lack. Beyond penalties, the government has interests by virtue of its property holdings (for example, public lands, conservation easements) and contractual positions (for example, habitat conservation plans under the Endangered Species Act) that private parties lack.
146. Brian Stern also makes this point. Stern, supra note 125, at 96. The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 1003 share an interest in the supremacy of federal law. Together they can rebuff any state court that improperly restricts federal law. Not only does this coincidence of interest lessen the utility of the Freund-Fletcher rule, it also means the Supreme Court could backtrack and overturn ASARCO with only a modicum of trauma, especially if ASARCO is seen to hang on a contingent understanding of consequences. 147 State courts might be resentful, but the Supreme Court's move would not risk a constitutional crisis-unlike, say, the Court's reversal of a previously approved usurpation by one of the coordinate branches. Prophylactic formalism is of little moment.
Or is it? All three branches do share a common interest in the supremacy of federal law, if supremacy is understood to mean uniform and faithful interpretations, or precedence over conflicting state and local laws. But the three branches may not agree on the desirability of enforcement actions brought by citizens who lack Article III standing. Justice Scalia, for one, maintains that citizen suits brought by plaintiffs who have not suffered a concrete, redressable injury-one that separates them out from the general public-violate the separation of powers.
148 Others share his view that standing has something to do with the separation of powers, but few have limned the connection so precisely.
149
Scalia asserts that suits by " uninjured" or " ideological" plaintiffs disrupt the constitutionally prescribed distribution of powers in three ways. First, they shift the timing of judicial action. 150 Issues that might have been resolved through the elected branches get pressed on the courts immediately, forcing the courts to speak while political fires burn hot. Second, ideological suits bring to the courts' attention matters that properly belong to the elected branches.
151 Quite simply, statutes and constitutional clauses that neither create nor prevent concrete, individualized harms do not belong in the courts. Third, these suits supplant " the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty," namely, to " 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. '" 152 Were Congress positioned to empower " any citizen" to enforce its laws, Congress could usurp a central element of the executive's Article II prerogatives. Justice Scalia has always presented his 147. See infra Section IV.D for one such explanation of ASARCO.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983) .
149. For example, Judge Fletcher's cryptic assertion that the case-or-controversy requirement is a " valuable, even indispensable" limitation on the judicial power suggests a latent concern for the separation of powers. See Fletcher, supra note 45, at 283.
150. Scalia, supra note 148, at 892. 151. Id. 152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that citizen suits for civil penalities supplant the executive's Article II prerogatives).
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State Courts 1029 analysis in terms of the federal courts, yet it would seem to apply just as forcefully to the adjudication of federal claims in state courts. Recall my purpose in wandering down the separation-of-powers lane: to detect a threat, a trace of creeping tyranny, that might justify the prophylactic, " pragmatic formalism" of Professors Redish and Cisar, 153 which in turn might justify the institutional formalism of the FreundFletcher rule. So motivated, I need concern myself only with Justice Scalia's charge that lenient standing allows Congress to usurp the executive's Article II duties. It is hard to see incidental changes in the timing of judicial decisions (Scalia's first complaint) as an encroachment on or suppression of one of the coordinate branches. A quick turnaround from the courts may affect the tenor of politics and the modes of political expression, but it does not deprive the judicial branch of any powers or accrete judicial responsibilities to the legislative or executive domains. If the implication of standing for the timing of judicial decisions is a separation-of-powers concern at all, it belongs to a different genus than do the encroachments and suppressions properly warded off with a prophylaxis of formalism.
Justice Scalia's second quibble with liberalized standing-that it presents the courts with issues the executive and legislative branches should decide-collapses into his first and third concerns. If a statute creates no material injuries to private persons, and injury in fact is requisite to standing, it does not follow that the courts will never adjudicate a challenge to the statute. The state remains a prospective plaintiff. The absence of citizen plaintiffs would make a challenge less likely (changing the timing of judicial action) and would let the attorney general nurse a statute into desuetude (an Article II prerogative?), but the lack of citizen plaintiffs would not categorically exclude judicial resolution of the issue.
I have pared Justice Scalia's separation-of-powers theory down to a single issue-the executive's Article II prerogatives-that may call for the Freund-Fletcher rule on grounds of pragmatic formalism. To Article II I now turn.
Justice Scalia's theory of congressional usurpation (of executive duties) via citizen suits turns on probabilities and political accountability. It is an almost certain bet that for any statute Congress enacts, someoneaccountable to no one-is chomping at the bit to enforce it. Absent an injury-causation-redressability requirement for standing, Congress could shunt these activists into court and get immediate declaratory judgments, which the rule against advisory opinions bars Congress from obtaining for itself. Not so if the activist must bring her claim before state courts. Congress wields no control over jurisdiction there. All Congress can do is authorize state-court citizen suits by non-Article III plaintiffs. Whether the would-be private attorney general actually gets into court depends on jurisdictional rules adopted by courts and legislatures accountable to state electorates. 154 This is no slippery slope toward tyranny. The Court may need pragmatic formalism in its separation-of-powers jurisprudence to guard against the arrogation of power to a single branch, but there is not the remotest threat of incipient tyranny in congressional actions that displace power to democratically accountable state institutions.
155 Quite the contrary: This discharge of federal executive powers enhances the diffusion of authority, adding a " vertical" separation (between the national government and the states) to the " horizontal" division of powers among Congress, the executive branch, and the federal courts.
To my mind, the fact that state-court citizen suits by non-Article III plaintiffs do not effect a congressional usurpation of executive power eliminates the separation-of-powers concern. Others may not be satisfied, though, because the executive's prosecutorial prerogatives remain unprotected.
156 Redish and Cisar, for instance, would guard against any diminishment of a branch's powers, even if the powers removed from or restricted within that branch are not assumed by another.
157 But there is a problem with imposing Article III on state courts in the interest of Article II: A theory of standing constructed from injury, causation, and redressability does little to advance the executive's enforcement priorities. As Dean Nichol has observed, the " injured" plaintiff is no more likely than the " uninjured" plaintiff to have objectives that coincide with the executive's.
158 Indeed, a public-spirited executive sensitive to public choice pressures might prefer that citizen groups focus on violations that have not yet created exceptional, localized injuries. Political imperatives lead the executive to respond to concentrated harms, so the usual story goes, whereas diffuse or distant problems receive too little attention. The redressability requirement generates similar dilemmas. Faced with resource constraints, the executive may well prefer to train its prosecutorial 154 . Bear in mind that many state court judges face the threat of ballot-box sanctions, or recall by the other branches. Lifetime appointments for state judges are relatively uncommon.
155. One implication of this analysis is that congressional " incentives" (for example, grantsin-aid, threats of preemption) for the states to open up their courts, as suggested in Grantham, supra note 13, would pose a separation-of-powers problem.
156. But my view better fits the constitutional text, which in at least one place authorizes acts by one branch that diminish the reach of another, yet without allowing interbranch transfer of powers. See infra p. 1037 (discussing the Exceptions Clause).
157. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 135, at 480-90. 158. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 , 1163 -65 (1993 .
State Courts 1031 capacities on present and looming violations, and leave it to citizens' groups to collect the fines for past misfeasances.
159
Jurists devoted to prosecutorial and administrative discretion would do well to scrutinize provisions for executive oversight and control of private attorneys general, rather than exhaust their energies on standing. Perhaps Article II should be read to entitle the executive to call off certain citizeninitiated enforcement actions, but it should not be understood to mandate an injury-causation-redressability brand of standing.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that Article II authorizes the executive to ignore statutory directives. Professor Sunstein argues that both the text and the history of the Take Care Clause point to an executive duty commensurate with the executive's power. 160 This clause does not instruct the executive to implement the laws as if they were written to fit the executive's policy preferences; rather the executive is to implement the laws faithfully, in accord with their structures, purposes, plain meanings, and the like. Viewed from this perspective, Scalia's executive has the sheen of an unconstitutional über-executive.
To recap, solicitude for the separation of powers does not warrant imposing Article III on state court adjudication of federal questions. The possibility of unreviewable state court decisions on federal questions poses no practical threat to the supremacy of federal law. Nor can Congress usurp executive prerogatives via the state courts. Statutes that authorize nonArticle III plaintiffs to bring claims in state court displace control over standing law to the states; such statutes certainly do not arrogate executive powers to Congress. Dispersals of power ought not to be countered with institutionally formal separation-of-powers doctrines. My intuitions on this point find reassurance in two further observations, which cast doubt on the injury-causation-redressability theory of standing. First, conditioning citizen suits on Article III standing does little to advance the executive's role in implementing the law. Second, the Take Care Clause may not even grant to the executive the discretion that Article III standing purportedly safeguards. If the constitutional merits of Article III standing doctrine are doubtful, judges should be chary of extending the reach of the doctrine. Allowing state courts to apply their own standing law to federal claims may ultimately feed back into better Article III doctrine, a point developed below.
159. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) , erects an Article III bar to this division of responsibilities.
160. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992 Given that a pragmatically formal conception of the separation of powers does not condemn ASARCO, I propose to make a presumptive decision between ASARCO and its competitor, the Freund-Fletcher rule, with an even-handed assessment of the meaning of supremacy, and textually anchored considerations of policy. With a presumption made, one can survey the legal landscape for signs of reassurance, or reasons for reconsideration.
Supremacy has twin meanings: power and quality. (Doubters may check the dictionary.) 161 To uphold the supremacy (power) of federal law is to ensure that the states do not infringe upon the constitutionally circumscribed domain of federal law, and to give maximal effect to the will of Congress expressed in law, insofar as Congress acts within its limited powers. These principles are exemplified, respectively, by the dormant Commerce Clause 162 and the nondiscrimination doctrine. 163 But to uphold the supremacy (quality) of federal law is also-if secondarily, for surely supremacy as power was the Framers' main concern-to nourish rule-oflaw values like uniformity, to safeguard the political legitimacy of the courts and other governing institutions, 164 and to make interpretations with an eye to good results.
The ASARCO rule better comports with the twin meanings of supremacy than does the Freund-Fletcher alternative. Most importantly, ASARCO poses no threat to the will of Congress (power) as embodied in its environmental statutes. To the contrary, federal environmental law typically provides for citizen-suit enforcement by " any person." It is the Supreme Court's Article III jurisprudence that prevents the congressional scheme from being realized in the federal courts. Allowing non-Article III plaintiffs to be heard in state courts would enable the private attorney general to work, functionally, more like Congress intended.
Second, even though ASARCO authorizes state courts to issue nonreviewable interpretations of federal law, the holding presents virtually no risk of state encroachment on the federal domain, and it poses only a minor, short-term threat to uniformity. If a state's high court decides for a 161. 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 274 (2d ed. 1989) 
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State Courts 1033 non-Article III plaintiff, there is no problem at all-the U.S. Supreme Court may review the state court ruling. If the state court decides against the plaintiff, it creates unreviewable state court precedent for an improperly narrow reading of the federal law. This is no cause for concern. As suggested earlier, 165 Article III plaintiffs would forum-shop, pressing their claims in federal court, where state court decisions carry no authority beyond their intrinsic persuasiveness. In the rare circumstance that the law at issue affects no particular, individualized, concrete interests, and thus no Article III plaintiff conceivably exists, the question could still reach the federal courts on appeal from another state supreme court's (contrary) decision or, more likely, through enforcement proceedings brought by a U.S. Attorney. During the intervening period, the only parties who would be hurt by the state court's restrictive interpretation are those without Article III standing-parties who would be forever excluded from the courts, against the statutorily expressed will of Congress, under the FreundFletcher model.
166
Moving beyond quality-as-uniformity, my approach to the Supremacy Clause inquires about impacts on the legitimacy of lawgiving institutions. Judge Fletcher claims to have identified one problem with ASARCO in this regard, namely, that it allows state courts to issue decisions binding in the state yet untouchable by the institutional procedures-state legislative action or constitutional amendment-that ordinarily correct judicial overreaching. 167 Yet ASARCO positions the U.S. Supreme Court to correct any instance of state court overreaching; it is only judicial underreaching that remains immune to review. Nothing stands in the way of a state legislature that wants to shore up (with state law) any federal statute or constitutional clause that the state's courts have interpreted meanly.
Finally, one must ask whether ASARCO or the Freund-Fletcher competitor would yield better results. One should proceed cautiously, though, and not use this opening as a pretext for feeding personal policy preferences into the Supremacy Clause. To this end I propose to read " good results" in terms of immanent constitutional norms and opportunities for learning about the consequences of constitutional doctrine. This connects the good results and legitimacy facets of my analysis. Judicial rulings that abjure the idea of judge as policy-kingmaker help to safeguard people's trust in the courts. So too should interpretations that describe a coherent, integrated Constitution. Understanding " good results" in terms of immanent constitutional norms leads me at last to federalism, the most obvious rationale for the ASARCO rule. Judge Fletcher dismisses federalism concerns by comparing the common case-or-controversy requirement to exclusive federal jurisdiction. 168 His analogy is inapt. The Freund-Fletcher rule burdens state courts with responsibility for the arcane and cumbersome Article III jurisprudence, whereas exclusive federal jurisdiction abates the federal lading on state courts. State court rules of justiciability reflect state judicial and legislative judgments about the efficient administration of justice and the institutional competence of state courts. In a federal system, the national branches ought to respect, presumptively, state courts' self-governance. A plausible, incidental benefit of national respect for state courts is greater state court attentiveness to federal interests and the fine points of federal questions-which increases the effective supremacy of federal law.
169
I am not suggesting that the federal structure of the Constitution mandates the ASARCO rule, or prevents Congress from requiring state courts to abide by Article III when hearing federal questions. I propose only that federalism, as a constitutional norm, should guide interpretive choices when multiple avenues are open, as they are here.
170
There remains but one more issue to consider, the opportunities-forlearning aspect of " good results." Judge Fletcher maintains that the common case-or-controversy requirement would make state and federal courts " genuine partners," with salutary consequences for the doctrine of standing.
171 Here again he shoots wide of the mark. True, state courts wellpracticed in the ways of liberal standing might vent their frustration with federal strictures to the Supreme Court, to good effect. But it is a stretch to maintain, as Judge Fletcher does, that this would make the Supreme Court accountable to state courts. 172 The Supreme Court would remain free to spin out the meaning of Article III as it wishes, and state courts would have to follow suit. As for the alleged need for state court accountability to the Supreme Court in standing decisions, 173 this seems to be either an opaque Contrary to Judge Fletcher's supposition, a common standard of justiciability probably would impede the development of better standing law. Students of standing would be positioned for keener insight were the courts to apply a diversity of standing protocols to the same subject matter. Right now, the requisite doctrinal array exists among the state courts, but only rarely are these doctrines applied to the same substantive issues. 174 Yet if the evolution of environmental law vindicates the predictions of this Note, these varied conceptualizations of standing will come to be applied with some frequency to the same body of substantive law. This will allow academics better to assess the strengths and limitations of the Supreme Court's standing doctrine. It thus augurs well for constructive developments in case-or-controversy jurisprudence, more so than would a forced " conversation" that amounts to lecture from one side and futile protestation from the other.
To summarize, the Supreme Court is right to tolerate state court adjudication of federal citizen-suits brought by non-Article III plaintiffs. This practice allows a fuller realization of Congress's purpose in deputizing private attorneys general. It respects the autonomy of state courts and background norms of federalism. It bodes well for useful developments in the doctrines of justiciability. And it poses at most only minor, short-term threats to the uniformity of federal law.
E. ASARCO and the Legal Landscape
ASARCO compliments a number of jurisprudential developments that recognize roles for public entities other than the federal courts in the interpreting and developing of federal law. Judge Fletcher's survey of the legal landscape emphasizes older sources: The Federalist Papers, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and Chief Justice Marshall's pontifications on the self-sufficiency of the federal government.
175 Wrote Marshall, famously, in McCulloch v. Maryland: No trace is to be found in the constitution, of an intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are Reflect for a moment on the occasions in which federal courts have stayed their hand. These outcroppings of restraint are not random aberrations.
188 They cohere, when viewed through the Supremacy Clause lens described in this Note. Deference to administrative agencies, even on ambiguous questions of law, makes sense because, first, the agencies are better positioned to evaluate consequences for public welfare (quality of federal law), and, second, there is no " external" threat (that is, no threat from the states) to the power of federal law. The political question doctrine makes sense because, for a limited set of issues, the political legitimacy costs of judicial involvement are feared to exceed the rule-of-law benefits.
An account of the Supremacy Clause sensitive to the legitimacy of federal law is the only way to make sense of the Exceptions Clause. A delicate measure, the Exceptions Clause allows Congress to retaliate against a " bad" Court-but not by arrogating judicial powers to the legislative branch. Rather, when Congress withdraws appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, it is the state courts and lower federal courts that gain authority. A theory of the separation of powers that mandates the FreundFletcher rule would also require that the Exceptions Clause be read out of the Constitution.
Finally, the Court's reluctant policing of local government " takings" bears a relation to the Court's self-denying gloss on the ICRA. While counties and municipalities are not " sovereigns" like Indian tribes, valued histories and practices of self-governance do exist among counties and 183. 25 U.S.C. § § 1301-1341 (1994 
V. CONSEQUENCES
Lest the arguments of this Note come across as idle speculation, I now draw the reader's attention to a practical, real-world domain that could be thoroughly restructured by non-Article III plaintiffs in state courts: citizen suits for " past" violations of federal environmental laws. Recall the illogic of constitutional barriers to citizen suits for past violations. Public choice pressures lead the executive to focus on exceptional and immediate harms; citizens' groups can help fulfill a statute's promise of deterrence by bringing claims for past violations that otherwise would be overlooked.
189
In Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 190 decided in 1987, a unanimous Supreme Court read the jurisdictional language of the CWA to preclude citizen suits for wholly past violations. This case had widespread implications, for several other statutes parroted the jurisdictional provision of the CWA, which authorizes citizen suits against parties alleged " to be in violation" of their discharge permits. 191 Since the mid-1980s, Congress has been somewhat more fastidious in its diction.
192 EPCRA, for instance, authorizes any person to sue an owner or operator of a facility " for failure to do" any of several mandates, some of which are time-specific.
193
EPCRA requires companies to divulge their annual releases of toxic chemicals. Prospective defendants who receive notice of a pending suit usually disclose the requisite information and move for dismissal if the suit is filed. Until 1995, when the Sixth Circuit decided Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 194 every district court that had faced the question distinguished EPCRA from the CWA and allowed these suits to proceed. 195 United Musical Instruments shut the door, extending the Supreme Court's conclusions in Gwaltney to EPCRA. Less than a year later, however, the Seventh Circuit nudged it open again in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co. 196 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and forged a new path, in effect reinterpreting Gwaltney as a standing decision. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the citizen-plaintiffs failed the test of redressability. 197 The plaintiffs had sought a declaratory judgment, civil penalties, costs and attorneys fees, an order requiring the petitioner to provide the respondent with copies of reports submitted to the EPA, and authorization to inspect Steel Company's facilities. None of these, posited Scalia, would ameliorate or compensate for past harms. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, declined to reach the question of standing, ruling instead that the jurisdictional provisions of EPCRA do not allow citizen claims for wholly past violations.
In the wake of Steel Co., public interest groups basically gave up on EPCRA suits, 198 just as the Seventh Circuit feared they would. 199 This is no trivial matter. Suits for disclosure under EPCRA can be keystones for community organizing, and the unwelcome publicity that disclosure of pollution data attracts has led many companies to reduce their chemical emissions voluntarily. 200 The arguments developed in this Note suggest that citizen suits for past violations have a future in state courts, but whether EPCRA, as it now stands, will prove enforceable in 213 " No one ever questioned AT&T's long distance monopoly," quipped one veteran public interest lawyer, " until a brazen fellow founded a company called MCI and proved that AT&T had no statutory basis for its position."
214 State-court/federal-law enforcement actions by non-Article III plaintiffs will not revolutionize environmental law like MCI did telecommunications, but the comparison ought not to tarnish any modest gains around the margins.
VI. CONCLUSION
Standing is an especial problem for the enforcement of environmental laws, many of which do not aim, or aim directly, to prevent " injuries" to people. The existence of an Article III plaintiff positioned to challenge a violation can be fortuitous. This Note predicts and defends a turn toward the state courts, which can hear the federal claims of plaintiffs who lack Article III standing.
My prediction of a new role for state courts in the enforcement of federal environmental law emerges from three recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court extended its doctrine of standing in ways that curb environmentalists' access to the federal courts. Meanwhile, the Court strengthened the presumption of state court jurisdiction over federal laws. Lastly, in ASARCO v. Kadish, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of state courts to hear the federal claims of non-Article III plaintiffs, and gave judgments in favor of non-Article III plaintiffs collateral effect in federal court.
The new niche for state courts will not extend to every violation of the federal environmental statutes. There are three limiting factors. First, the environmental statutes tend to be textually ambiguous on the question of state court jurisdiction, though seven of the nine major statutes likely admit of concurrent jurisdiction when read in the light of the Supreme Court's most recent decisions. Second, claims against the instrumentalities of the federal government face constitutional and statutory barriers. Finally, the states have discretion to impose Article III standing on federal law claimants-though many state courts interpret standing quite liberally, especially in environmental cases.
212. On cooperative federalism and the indirect enforcement of federal standards through state law, see supra text accompanying note 121.
213. This was Alex Levinson of the Sierra Club, for whom I did the research that grew into this Note.
214. Interview with Jim Morman, supra note 210.
State court adjudication of non-Article III plaintiffs' federal claims has encountered some resistance from academics over the years. The most thoughtful attack issued from the pen of Judge Fletcher, a year after the Supreme Court decided ASARCO. This Note calls into question Judge Fletcher's critique.
I locate my defense of ASARCO-and the associated conception of the Supremacy Clause-in the context of the Supreme Court's recent holdings on federalism and the separation of powers. When interpreting a structural feature of the Constitution, I argue, the Supreme Court should begin with an inquiry into dangers. If the provision guards against " tyranny" or another catastrophe, the Court should impose a doctrine of formal rules that keep one branch from assuming control over the settled practices of another. If the provision calls into doubt core, settled practices of governance that do not hint at a looming conflict or a power grab between the executive and legislative branches, the Court has little choice but to cast its decision in terms of flexible standards. Otherwise, the Court should assemble doctrine from an even-handed reading of the constitutional text.
State court adjudication of federal claims raised by non-Article III plaintiffs neither suggests the prospect of an interbranch power-grab, nor calls into doubt settled practices of governance. Thus my argument turns to the text. Supremacy has twin meanings: power and quality. The ASARCO rule, I suggest, better serves the power and quality of federal law than would the common case-or-controversy alternative favored by Professor Freund and Judge Fletcher. As regards power, ASARCO gives maximal effect to the will of Congress as expressed in federal statutes, and permits virtually no state encroachment on the domain of federal law. As regards quality, ASARCO meshes with immanent norms of federalism and creates new opportunities for learning about standing doctrine. Any threat ASARCO may pose to the uniformity of federal law is de minimis. Furthermore, ASARCO fits comfortably into the modern legal landscape, which features important roles for institutions other than the federal courts in developing federal law.
